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Abstract 
The oil and gas industry are moving into Integrated Operations which will reduce costs, 
increase production and extend the lifetime of mature fields. They are going to achieve this 
through better utilization of drilling and production data, and close collaboration between 
offshore and land based personnel. 
 
Traditional offshore operations (e.g. drilling production, delivery, etc.) are going to be 
controlled by onshore control centers, using ICT solutions, and in collaboration with sub 
contractors and other business partners. 
 
This new way of working creates new work processes that have great information security 
implications. A security incident such as a hacker attack or a virus can for example lead to 
loss of control of systems or failure of control systems.  Some implications can be costly 
downtime, injuries or loss of life. 
 
A conceptual model of a generic oil and gas company has been created and simulations have 
been run showing the behavior of the system when incidents happen. These incidents affects 
the resilience of the system, and if severe or if the company does not have proper management 
policies in place, the system can move into an undesirable state. 
 
The main conclusion is that it is important for management to keep a focus on and allocate 
enough resources for pro active work such as information security. This is especially valid 
when the system has been hit by an incident and its resilience can be weakened. If not done 
correctly the system can go into an undesirable state of under performance. 
 
These insights are shown in system archetypes. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Integrated Operations 
Integrated Operations, or eOperations, is going to increase production, reduce costs and 
extend the lifetime of mature fields in the Norwegian offshore sector through better utilization 
of drilling and production data, and closer collaboration between offshore and land-based 
personnel. 
 
Integrated Operations entails a new operations practice and with it operators can make better 
and faster decisions using ICT solutions that include real-time data to integrate work 
processes across disciplines and between organizations. With the aid of Integrated Operations 
activities can be managed regardless of geographical distance, e.g. between offshore 
platforms and land base control centers. The goal is a reduction of operating costs by 30 
percent, 10 percent in increased production and up to 4-5 percent increase in recovery rate. 
 
When traditional offshore operations such as drilling, production, delivery etc, which is 
mostly located at the offshore platforms, are gradually being substituted by onshore operation 
via computer networks, the success hinges on mastering the information security issues that 
arise. 
 
1.1.1 Potential Threats 
Gonzalez et al.(2005) describes the information security implications spawned by Integrated 
Operations. From the point of view of information security the transition that spans a long 
time period (10-12 years) is an “engine” that generates vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities being 
weaknesses in the Integrated Operations environment that facilitates intended or unintended 
incidents.  
 
An unintended incident could occur if an onshore operator – believing that the system is in 
test mode – inadvertently closes valves, thus causing an organizational accident and down-
time. A mixture of intended and unintended incident could be caused when a contractor, who 
under maintenance operations, connects to the Integrated Operations intranet and 
inadvertently introduces malware from his PC to the intranet. An intended incident could be a 
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network attack, for example a (D)DoS-attack or intrusion on the intranet. Summing up, the 
Integrated Operations intranet is vulnerable both to unintended incidents (insider failures) and 
outsider attacks. 
 
In (Hocking 2005), Paul Hocking, BP PetroTech Advisor – Automation, addresses some 
dangers affiliated with Integrated Operations. E.g. are general hacker threat, malicious code 
attack specifically directed against operator, insider threats from within or its business and 
digital business suppliers, partners and contractors. He points out that a cyber attack can lead 
to: 
- Failure of control systems 
- Loss of integrity or control of systems 
- Loss of process monitoring and visibility of plant 
 
The effect of such incidents can be: 
- Risk of injury or loss of life 
- Loss of production 
- Environmental damage 
- Damage to reputation 
- License to operate can be jeopardized 
 
Worms such as Code Red, Nimda, Slammer, Blaster and Sasser have all affected process 
control systems. In January 2003 the Slammer worm penetrated a private computer network at 
Ohio’s David-Besse nuclear power plant and disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly 
five hours, despite a belief by plant personnel that the network was protected by a firewall 
(Poulsen 2003). Other examples are a disgruntled employee that attacked a sewage control 
system and released millions of gallons of sewage into a river and hotel ground, and a 
manufacturing plant that grinded to a halt when a security scan crashed hundreds of PLCs 
(Programmable Logic Controllers) (Lowe 2006). 
 
1.2 Research questions 
1. What are the main characteristics of resilience in a system presented in the form of a 
conceptual model of Integrated Operations when focusing on information security as a QIP 
(quality improvement process)? 
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2. Describe these findings in dynamic stories and system archetypes. 
 
3. Suggest some policies/solution archetypes that increase resilience (against negative 
change). 
 
4. Resilience can also be towards positive change, can archetypes identifying some important 
reasons for resilience in Integrated Operations when viewing information security as a QIP 
be created? 
 
1.3 Thesis structure 
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the problem area of integrated operations and the 
information security problems that is connected to it. It goes on to state the research questions 
this thesis attempts to answer. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the methodology used in the thesis. System dynamics, causal loop 
diagrams, system archetypes and resilience are areas described. 
 
Chapter 3 shortly describes how most organizations view information security today. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the origin of the model, the assumptions it is based on. Goes on to give a 
thorough description of the stocks in the model and the core structure of it that is made up of 
four feedback loops. 
 
Chapter 5 contains model verification and validation. Describes the thoughts behind the 
model and how it works and tests that have been made. 
 
Chapter 6 goes on to describe simulations of different management policies in the model 
with dynamic stories. The simulations focus on how the system behaves when it is affected by 
one incident. 
 
Chapter 7 continues describing simulations that have been performed. The dynamic stories 
describe what happens to the system when it is affected by multiple incidents. 
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Chapter 8 shows simulations of how the system behaves when it is faced with an increase in 
the demanded performance. 
 
Chapter 9 contains discussion on the different policies simulated and gives some 
recommendations. It also describes the dynamic behavior of the model with system 
archetypes. 
 
Chapter 10 concludes the findings that have been made and makes some suggestions for 
further research. 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 System Dynamics 
System dynamics is a methodology for studying and managing complex feedback systems, 
such as one finds in for example ecological and economic systems. System dynamics has been 
used to address practically every sort of feedback system. And what differentiates system 
dynamics is the use of feedback loops. Feedback refers to the situation of X affecting Y and Y 
in turn affecting X, possibly through a chain of causes and effect. 
2.1.1 Causal Loop Diagrams 
In (Sterman 2000) causal loop diagrams are described. As mentioned, feedback is one of the 
core concepts of system dynamics. Yet our mental models often fail to include critical 
feedbacks determining the dynamics of our system. In system dynamics several diagramming 
tools are used to capture the structure of systems, one method being causal loop diagrams. 
 
They are an important tool for representing the feedback structure of systems and are 
excellent for 
- Quickly capturing your hypothesis about the causes of dynamics; 
- Eliciting and capturing the mental models of individuals or teams; 
- Communicating the important feedbacks you believe are responsible for a problem. 
 
A causal diagram consists of variables connected by arrows denoting the causal influences 
among the variables. Variables are related by causal links, shown by arrows. Each causal link 
is assigned a polarity, either positive (+) or negative (-) to indicate how the dependent variable 
changes when the independent variable changes. 
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Positive feedback loop 
 
Figure 1 – An example of a positive feedback loop. 
 
Sterman (2000) states: 
A positive link means that if the cause increases, the effect increases above what it would 
otherwise have been, and if the cause decreases, the effect decreases below what it otherwise 
would have been. 
 
In the example above an increase in fractional birth rate will lead to an increase in birth rate 
above what it would otherwise have been. A decrease in fractional birth rate will lead to a 
decrease in birth rate what it would otherwise have been. 
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Negative feedback loop 
 
Figure 2 – An example of a negative feedback loop. 
 
Sterman (2000) states: 
A negative link means that if the cause increases, the effect decreases below what it would 
otherwise have been, and if the cause decreases, the effect increases above what it would 
otherwise have been. 
 
In the example of a negative feedback loop, an increase in average lifetime will lead to a 
decrease in death rate below what it would otherwise have been. Vice versa, a decrease in 
average lifetime will lead to an increase in death rate above what it would otherwise have 
been. 
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Figure 3 – An example of feedback loops connected. 
 
Link polarities describe the structure of the system. They do not describe the behavior of the 
variables. That is they describe what would happen if there were a change. They do not 
describe what actually happens. Also, note the phrase above (below) what it otherwise would 
have been in the definition of link polarity. An increase in a cause variable does not 
necessarily mean that the effect will increase. First, a variable has more than one input and to 
determine the actual outcome one needs to know how all the inputs are changing. Second, and 
more importantly, causal loop diagrams do not distinguish between stocks and flows. For 
example, an increase in birth rate will increase the population (above what it would otherwise 
have been), but a decrease in birth rate does not decrease population. You cannot tell whether 
the population is actually rising or declining. Population will be falling even if the birth rate 
rises if the death rate exceeds births. 
 
Due to the feedback structure, it is common that loops are formed. A loop can be either 
positive (reinforcing) or negative (balancing). Positive (reinforcing) loops are denoted by a + 
or R. Negative (balancing) loops are denoted by a – or B. In a reinforcing loop a change is 
strengthened and reinforced, in a balancing loop a change is opposed. 
 
A link in a causal loop diagram can have a delay, denoted by to crossing bars. For example: 
when population increases there is a delay before the (majority) of the population becomes 
old and dies. 
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2.1.2 Stocks and flows 
Causal loops are very useful in many situations. At the start of a modeling project capturing 
mental models, and at the end of a project, communicating the results of a completed model. 
However it suffers from some shortcomings and limitations. Maybe the most important is 
their inability to capture stock and flow structures of a system. Stocks and flows are together 
with feedback the two most central concepts of dynamic systems theory. 
 
Sterman (2000) defines stocks the following way: 
“Stocks are accumulations. They characterize the state of the system and generate the 
information upon which decisions and actions are based. Stocks give systems inertia and 
provide them with memory. Stocks create delays by accumulating the difference between the 
inflow to a process and its outflow. By decoupling rates of flow, stocks are the source of 
disequilibrium dynamics in systems.” 
 
Stocks are familiar to us and we experience them every day. Example: the amount of cash in 
our bank account. What we spend is the outflow, and deposits are the inflow. The workforce 
in a company is a stock that increases through hiring and decreases via the rate of layoffs, 
retirements and quits. 
 
Sterman (2000) uses the following notation for stocks and flows: 
- Stocks are represented by rectangles (suggesting a container holding the contents of 
the stock). 
- Inflows are represented by a pipe (arrow) pointing to (adding to) the stock. 
Outflows are represented by pipes pointing out of (subtracting from) the stock. 
- Valves control the flows. 
- Clouds represent the sources and sinks for the flows. A source represents the stock 
from which a flow originating outside the boundary of the model arises; sinks 
represent the stocks into which flows leaving the model boundary drain. Sources and 
sinks are assumed to have infinite capacity and can never constrain the flows they 
support. 
 
Stock and flow diagramming notation 
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Figure 4 – An example of classic stock and flow diagramming notation. 
 
A much used and helpful metaphor for a stock is a bathtub. The amount of water in your 
bathtub at any time is the accumulation of the water flowing into the tub minus the water 
flowing out through the drain (the assumption being that there is no evaporation and 
splashing). The inflow is usually different from the outflow. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Thinking of a stock as a bathtub can be a helpful metaphor. 
 
Sterman (2000) uses the following the notation to represent the process of accumulation: 
 
 Stock = INTEGRAL(Inflow – outflow, Stockt0) 
 
2.1.3 System archetypes 
System archetypes are a relatively new way of thinking in system dynamics. In his book  
“The Fifth Discipline” from 1990 (Senge 1990), Peter M. Senge describes systems thinking 
and introduces archetypes as particular types of cycles that describe systems. Senge 
emphasizes the importance of feedback in systems thinking and seeing relations rather than 
linear cause-and-effect chains. 
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The ten archetypes defined in “The Fifth Discipline” are Balancing Process with Delay, 
Limits to Growth, Shifting the Burden, Shifting the Burden to the Intervener, Eroding Goals, 
Escalation, Success to the Successful, Tragedy of the Commons, Fixes that Fail and Growth 
and Underinvestment. 
 
Further work on system archetypes are done by E. F. Wolstenholme in his award winning 
paper “Towards the definition and use of a core set of archetypal structures in system 
dynamics.” from 2002 (Wolstenholme 2002). In this paper Wolstenholme discusses system 
archetypes both as a device to aid model conceptualization and as a means of presenting 
insights derived from a model. Wolstenholme argues that there are four totally generic system 
archetypes, Underachievement, Out-of-control, Relative Achievement and Relative Control. 
He describes the archetypes and gives examples of each of them. Also, for each problem 
archetype there is a solution archetype which is described and shown both generic and with 
examples. An important aspect which is stressed in this paper is the existence of 
organizational boundaries. There are several types of boundaries. A boundary may be 
between an organization and its environment, it could be a physical boundary between 
different parts of an organization or even a mental barrier between different groups or 
individuals in an organization. 
 
System archetypes are further discussed in Wolstenholme’s paper “Using generic system 
archetypes to support thinking and modeling.” (2004). Here he argues that boundaries should 
be added to the group of components that make up the system “structure” that the original 
concept of system dynamics consisted of, and that they are a fundamental facet of system 
behavior. Boundaries are described, both as to why they are so important, the effects they 
cause and their behavior. To some extent he describes the use of system archetypes in both the 
development of advanced models and in the dissemination of the same. Also there are some 
hints on how to identify feedback loops and archetypes in stock-and-flow diagrams. 
 
From (Wolstenholme 2002) “System archetypes were introduced as a formal and free-
standing way of classifying structures responsible for generic patterns of behavior over time, 
particularly counter-intuitive behavior. Such “structures” consist of intended actions and 
unintended reactions and recognize delays in reaction times. The system archetypes currently 
classified can be seen as a synthesis of much qualitative and quantitative modeling effort 
cumulated over many years by many analysts, which can be used to help to generate 
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understanding in new application domains. This isomorphic quality makes them a very 
powerful mechanism for accelerating learning in an increasingly turbulent world.” 
 
According to Wolstenholme an archetype has the following characteristics: 
- It’s composed of an intended consequence feedback loop which results from an action 
initiated in one sector of an organization with the intended consequence over time as a 
goal. 
- It contains an unintended consequence feedback loop, which is the result of a reaction 
in another sector of the organization or outside it. 
- There is a delay before the unintended consequence manifests itself. 
There is an organizational boundary that “hides” the unintended reaction from those who 
initiated the original action resulting in the intended outcome. For every problem archetype 
there is a solution archetype. 
 
 
Figure 6 – A generic problem archetype and its solution. Taken from (Wolstenholme 2002). 
 
2.2 Resilience 
The term resilience was introduced to the literature by the theoretical ecologist C. S. Holling. 
The paper “Ecological Resilience – In theory and application” (Gunderson 2000) reviews 
concepts and multiple meanings of resilience as they have appeared in literature and how 
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ecological resilience is key to management of complex systems of people and nature. 
Resilience has been defined in the ecological literature in two different ways, reflecting 
different aspects of stability. The multiple meanings of resilience are related to the existence 
of either single or multiple equilibriums in a system. 
 
Many authors define resilience as how long it takes for a system to return to a steady-state or 
equilibrium after a disturbance, the measure being how far the system has moved from that 
equilibrium and how quickly it returns. The implicit assumption being that there is only one 
steady state or equilibrium. If other operating states exist they should be avoided by applying 
safeguards. 
 
The second type of resilience emphasizes conditions far from steady state condition, where 
instabilities can flip a system into another regime of behavior. In this case resilience is 
measured by how much disturbance a system can absorb before moving into another domain 
of operations. 
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3 The State of Information Security 
The use of information technology seems almost infinite and affects almost every aspect of 
our lives. Health care, production of goods, logistics, financial institutions and the control of 
armies are just some examples of areas that are highly affected. And as the use of information 
technology grows, the potential negative impact of an intended or unintended incident grows 
with it. Armies can come to a halt, a stock may loose a hundred points, businesses may be 
bankrupted and individuals can loose their identity. Since its infant days the number of 
potential vulnerabilities in IT and the sophistication of attacks have grown immensely. In 
(Rogers 2005) and in Figure 7 from (Woody 2003) it is shown how attacks have gone from 
the more primitive attempts of password guessing, social engineering attacks and hijacking 
sessions to DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, advanced command and control, and 
the use of anti-forensic techniques. At the same time, the knowledge needed for an intruder to 
exploit these vulnerabilities has dropped dramatically. Attack tools, such as well written 
scripts, that exploit known vulnerabilities are wide spread and require less and less knowledge 
to use. 
 
 
Figure 7 – A graph showing the growing sophistications in attacks being made, and the lesser and lesser 
amount of knowledge the intruder needs to have to be able carry out such attacks . From (Woody 2003). 
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“The Global State of Information Security 2005” (PricewaterhouseCoopers) is a world wide 
survey conducted by CIO magazine and PricewaterhouseCoopers. The results are based on 
responses from more than 8,200 CEOs, CFOs, CIOs, CSOs, and vice presidents and directors 
of IT and information security from 63 countries. It covers a broad range of industries such as 
computer related manufacturing and software, consulting and professional services, banking, 
government and education. And the results paint a gloomy picture of the state of information 
security. Millions of personally identifiable records stolen, corporate espionage rings ranging 
from the UK to the Middle East that uses IT to infiltrate companies. Thousands of phishing 
scams, and not to forget spam, spyware, zombie networks and DDoS (distributed denial of 
service) attacks. And last but not least, worms and viruses. Borrowing from forestry parlance, 
businesses are fire fighters, constantly trying to put out fires, and preventing fire storms and 
big flare ups. 
 
And even though the numbers show an improvement in the battle to react and fight off 
security incidents, there is a lack of focus on actions and strategies that could prevent these 
incidents in the first place. Just 37 percent respond that they have an information security 
strategy, and only 24 percent of the rest says that creating one is in the plans for the next year. 
The most common proactive step respondents in the survey have taken is to develop business 
continuity and disaster recovery plans. That means that even the proactive steps taken are 
investments in reactive measures. But it is not all bad news. More organizations are 
employing security executives and focuses on integration between physical and information 
security. Those companies where the function resides near the top have far better security 
posture than the average respondent. Only 37 percent of respondents said they have an overall 
security strategy. At companies with CSOs, the number leaps to 62 percent. Companies with a 
security executive also report that their spending and policies are more aligned with the 
business. 
 
The financial services industry is highlighted as a best practices group. The financial sector 
has long been presumed to practice superior information security, largely because of the 
preciousness of their assets (which is money) and the fact that its business is carried out 
almost entirely on IT systems. The stakes are high, the risks are higher, and so the information 
security protection must be higher too. To en extent, the data supports the notion that 
companies in the money business are more strategic and more secure than the rest. Financial 
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services are already using risk models, returns on investment, and other strategic tools in other 
parts of business, and are now starting to apply these to information security. Also, the 
financial community knows regulations and has for a long time. One example of 
organizations in the financial industry being more strategic than others is their planned 
investment for the next year. Network firewalls is the fifth most strategic priority with all 
respondents, but it does not even reach the top ten with the financial services companies. The 
same is valid for data backup which is three overall but not on the financial companies radar. 
These companies have these important technologies in place, but also seems to have shifted 
priorities to a more strategic one, perhaps understanding that more technology does not mean 
more security. Banks was far more likely to have listed compliance testing as an important 
priority for next year, compared with overall respondents. 
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4 Modeling the problem 
How can one evaluate the effect of information security on oil and gas company’s 
performance, and the impact of information security on the company’s resilience against 
security incidents, both major and minor? This is an important question for the oil and gas 
industry as it ventures into the era of integrated operations. 
 
For the paper “Exploring Resilience Towards Risks in eOperations in the Oil and Gas 
Industry” (Rydzak et al. 2006. To appear in Springer's Lecture Notes for Computer Science) 
for the 2006 SAFECOMP conference, a conceptual model of a generic oil and gas company 
was created. Using this model I will look at different policies of allocating resources between 
production and security and hopefully learn some lessons on how they affect the company’s 
performance and resilience. 
 
The problem was suggested and supervised by Professor Jose J. Gonzalez and the modeling 
was done by Ph.D. student Felicjan Rydzak, research assistant Finn Olav Sveen, and me. 
 
We assume that integrated operations have been fully implemented and are in full 
deployment. All traditional production processes has been replaced by the Integrated 
Operations regime and so the model can be kept simple in that it need not consider the 
transition from traditional work processes to new ones, the introduction of new technology 
and the maturation of these processes. 
 
By the year 2012 the generic oil and gas company has fully implemented Integrated 
Operations. Traditional work processes such as drilling, production, delivery and others are 
now being operated remotely from onshore control centers. Operating costs have been 
reduced, production is up, and there is an increase in recovery rate. All this due to better 
utilization of production data, reduced staffing on site, and better collaboration between on- 
and offshore personnel and operators and their sub-contractors. 
 
The conceptual model represents the generic oil and gas company at a very high aggregation 
level. There are some aspects that are crucial when modeling the impact of resources on 
performance: 
- The company generates revenue proportional with its uptime.  
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- To simplify, managers have to consider two aspects; direct resources either to 
production or to security. 
- In today’s global market, competition is extremely fierce and every euro counts. So 
managers have a demand to justify every euro spent on improving and maintaining 
security, showing return on investment. Hence the assumption is that it is strict 
management policy to keep investments down. Every euro spent on resources for 
security means one less euro spent on resources for production, and vice versa. 
 
The model is an extended and adapted version of a casual loop diagram described by 
Repenning and Sterman in their paper “Nobody ever gets credit for fixing problems that never 
happened” (2001). Repenning and Sterman have, over the past decade, studied process 
improvement and learning programs, focusing on the dynamics of implementation and 
organizational change. The study covers such industries as telecommunications, 
semiconductors, chemicals, oil, automobile, and recreational products. 
 
Research suggests that the inability of many organizations to reap the full benefits of quality 
improvement programs is a problem that is rooted in how the introduction of a new 
improvement program interacts with the physical, economic, social, and psychological 
structures in which the implementation takes place. Not so much which specific improvement 
tool is chosen (Repenning and Sterman 2001). The theory in Repenning and Sterman’s paper 
initially originated from a study of two improvement initiatives at a major automotive maker, 
but they argue that their conceptual model is quite general and can be applied to a range of 
situations. Similar dynamics have been observed in almost every organization they have 
studied. 
 
Although it is still early, the trend is towards information security specifically and information 
technology in general to be viewed more as a traditional business process, and through that 
undergoing the same quality improvement programs as other processes in a business (Deloitte 
2005; Ernst&Young 2005; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004, 2005). 
 
4.1 Description of Model Stocks and Feedback Loops 
Following is a description of the stocks the model contains and the core structure of the model 
that is made up of four feedback loops. 
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4.1.1 Security level 
Our model consists of three stocks and their connecting flows. First we have the stock 
‘Security Level’ which has the flows ‘Security Level Increase’ and ‘Security Level Decrease’. 
 
 
Figure 8 – The Security Level stock in our model. 
 
At any given time the security level in a company is at a given level. The level indicates how 
well the company is strengthened when facing incidents such as hacker attacks, worms, etc. 
The security level can be increased through improvement work, but this work can be 
complicated and take time, and thus there is a delay from work being done on increasing 
security level and it actually improving. Also, over time, security level will decay with the 
discovery of new vulnerabilities, more sophisticated attacks, and who employees forget or 
ignore security policies. 
 
4.1.2 Resources for Increasing Security and Production 
To reflect the management issue of considering the two aspects of either allocating resources 
to increasing security or production we have the two stocks ‘Resources to Increase Security’ 
and ‘Resources for Production’. Managers have limited resources at their disposal and have to 
allocate them to either security or production. Resources can flow back and forth between the 
two, though with a delay. This is because moving people between different tasks takes time. 
 
 
Figure 9 – The stocks for resources for production and to increase security. 
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4.1.3 Feedback loops 
The full model consists of the three stocks and four main feedback loops. These four feedback 
loops are: 
1. B1: PRODUCTION FOCUS – WORKING HARD 
2. B2: SECURITY FOCUS – WORKING SMART 
3. B3: SHORTCUTS 
4. R: REINVESTMENT 
 
 
Figure 10 - A ”cleaned up” version of the model. Some lookup parameters are hidden. See appendices for 
full model view and model print out with all equations. 
 
By analyzing these four loops we can get an understanding of the models dynamic behavior. 
Following is a description of the four feedback loops. 
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4.1.4 B1: PRODUCTION FOCUS – WORKING HARD 
Our generic oil and gas company has a target for production which is shown in the model as 
‘Desired Performance’. Competition is fierce and margins are small, so every little deviation 
from the targeted production can lead to an economic loss. If an actual performance drops 
below desired a performance gap occurs. This drop in performance can be due to many 
reasons: bad weather, equipment trouble, employee failure, etc. The bigger the gap, the 
greater the pressure is to close it. To close this performance gap management can, and often 
will, decide to increase production by moving more resources to production. They do this by 
increasing ‘Pressure to do Work’ through ‘Pressure Allocation’. As a result production goes 
up and the performance gap decreases. But because of our assumption that the company has 
limited resources, increasing ‘Pressure to do Work’ through ‘Pressure Allocation’ will not 
only increase ‘Resources for Production’ but also reduce ‘Resources to Increase Security’ 
similarly. To understand why this happens we look at the feedback loop B2: SECURITY 
FOCUS – WORKING SMART 
 
4.1.5 B2: SECURITY FOCUS – WORKING SMART 
When management decides to increase the pressure towards production, the consequence is 
that pressure to increase security diminishes. This is shown in the model with ‘Pressure 
Allocation’. It has a positive effect on ‘Pressure to do Work’ and a negative effect on 
‘Pressure to Increase Security’. When ‘Pressure to do Work’ increases, more resources are 
allocated to ‘Resources for Production’. ‘Pressure to Increase Security’ decreases and 
‘Allocation of Resources to Security’ is reduced. With a delay the reduced resources for 
increasing security will have a negative impact on ‘Security Level Increase’ and ‘Security 
Level’ will start to decay. ‘Security Level’ has a positive effect on ‘Performance’, as more 
security means fewer disruptions. Thus, a diminishing ‘Security Level’ has a negative effect 
on the oil and gas company’s ‘Performance’, which is production. This has a negative effect 
on the goal of closing the performance gap through increased production. A different pressure 
from management towards production versus improving security could cause both feedback 
loop B1 and B2 to close the performance gap. To see how our oil and gas company can avoid 
this system reaction we have to simulate the model, which will be done in the next section. 
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4.1.6 R: REINVESTMENT 
The REINVESTMENT loop is a positive feedback loop that tends to strengthen whichever 
strategy chosen by management. Increasing ‘Pressure to do Work’ will lead to an increase in 
‘Resources for Production’ at the expense of resources devoted to increase security. As there 
are fewer resources to increase security, ‘Security Level’ will diminish having a negative 
effect on ‘Performance’. As ‘Performance’ does not recoup to its desired level, ‘Pressure to 
do Work’ increases even more, creating a vicious circle. The reinvestment loop can also work 
as a virtuous circle. If ‘Resources to Increase Security’ are increased, it will result in an 
increase in ‘Security Level’. As ‘Security Level’ has a positive effect on ‘Performance’ it will 
rise, freeing even more time to working proactively, that is increasing security. 
 
4.1.7 B3: SHORTCUTS 
The REINVESTMENT loop means that a temporary emphasis on one management strategy 
of pressure allocation towards either production or increasing security is likely to be 
reinforced and driven towards becoming permanent. Organizations that invest in improvement 
will experience increasing capability and find that they have more time to allocate to working 
smarter and less need for heroic efforts to solve problems by working harder (Repenning and 
Sterman 2001). But the reinvestment loop typically works in a downward, vicious direction 
rather that an upward virtuous direction, in organizations (Repenning and Sterman 2001). The 
reason for this is the shortcuts loop B3. This loop is also what makes it difficult balancing the 
allocation of resources between increasing security and production. 
 
When there is a performance gap, increasing pressure to work is a tempting solution. Making 
people work overtime, redirecting resources from improvement work (i.e. improving security) 
and cutting corners where possible, gives an immediate result in increased production. The 
negative effect of such a prioritization has a delay that “hides” them from decision makers. 
When there is a performance gap at our oil and gas company, employees and managers are 
tempted by the solution of taking shortcuts and cutting corners where possible to make up for 
the loss. As a temporary solution more pressure is allocated towards production. ‘Pressure to 
do Work’ increases, ‘Resources for Production’ goes up. More resources for production 
increases ‘Performance’. But abusing the shortcut can be costly in the longer run. 
The shortcuts loop and the reinvestment loop works together and creates something that 
(Repenning and Sterman 2001) calls the Capability trap. Managers often need an immediate 
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performance lift, and so they take shortcuts and skimp on proactive work, i.e. increasing 
security. The reinvestment loop, which works reinforcing on whatever regime that the system 
is in, eventually leads to a drop in capability, i.e. production. This causes the reinvestment 
loop to work as a vicious cycle, and what was intentionally a temporary shortcut to make up 
for losses can lead to so many (or severe) security and HSE (Health, Safety and Environment) 
incidents that the company’s performance suffers for a longer period of time. 
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5 Model Validation and Verification 
As Sterman states (2000, p.851): “all models are wrong”. And validation, in the true 
definition of the word, is impossible. More important questions are if the model is useful and 
does it shortcomings matter? Following in this section is a description of the model and some 
tests that have been performed. 
 
As previously mentioned the model consists of three stocks with connecting flows and four 
feedback loops. The dynamics of these loops have been described and I will not elaborate 
more on them here. 
 
In the model, the stock ‘Security Level’ simulates the level of security in the organization. 
‘Security Level’ can increase affected by ‘Resources to Increase Security’. This has some 
delay, as it takes time for workers to complete tasks successfully. Also there is a value 
indicating the effectiveness of the resources to increase security. This can simulate whether 
employees are efficient or they are doing a bad job. ‘Security Level’ also has an outflow, as it 
will deteriorate over time as people tend to forget security policies, new vulnerabilities are 
discovered, etc. 
 
Our assumption is that performance is dependent on the security level. If security level is 
poor, people will spend a lot of time on spam, cleaning up after virus attacks, etc., and as a 
result performance will suffer. There is a ‘Minimal Security Level Required for Optimal 
Performance’. This can be perceived as maintaining firewalls and/or other software protecting 
the operations against casual threats and disruptions. If security level drops below the 
minimum required level, optimal performance can not be achieved. 
 
The effect ‘Security Level’ has on ‘Performance’ is defined as a lookup graph which input 
depends on ‘Security Level’ and ‘Minimal Security Level Required for Optimal Performance’. 
If ‘Security Level’ is poor ‘Performance’ will be negatively affected. ‘Security Level’ has an 
impact on ‘Performance’, the assumption being that the higher the ‘Security Level’ the less 
time employees will spend on interruptions caused by threats and disruptions and there will be 
less downtime. A very high level of security can improve ‘Performance’ above what is 
produced by resources for production, but only to a certain degree. 
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To simulate an incident such as a hacker attack, a worm or a virus, or a malicious insider, in 
the model we have ‘Incident’ and ‘Incident Type’. ‘Incident Type’ ranges from a type 1 
incident to a type 6. Incident type 1 being insignificant and 6 being catastrophic. 0 indicates 
no incident. This is based on the risk matrix developed from our case studies for the oil and 
gas field in the Integrated Operations regime. The severity of an incident is affected by the 
organizations security level. The severity of an incident is more efficiently mitigated the 
higher the security level is. As an analogy one can think of a bullet proof vest, the better 
protection, the more of the blow is softened. If security level is high in the organization 
(security policies are in place and followed and systems are patched and updated) then the 
severity of an incident will not be as serious. 
 
Next, the effect of an incident on performance is decided by a look up graph. More severe 
incidents impair performance. In case of a catastrophic incident the performance can drop 
even to zero if there is not a sufficient level of security. ‘Performance’ is decided by the 
amount of resources dedicated for production, the effect of security level, and the effect of an 
incident (should one occur). If performance is below the desired performance a performance 
gap occurs. The performance gap together with the company’s goal to close performance gaps 
creates a pressure to close the gap. The larger the gap is, the higher the pressure to close it. 
 
The pressure to close the gap in the model is linked to ‘Pressure to Increase Security’ and 
‘Pressure to do work’. What decides which to be weighted is ‘Pressure Allocation’ that 
simulates management’s pressure towards focusing on either production or increasing 
security. It ranges from 0 to 1. 0 being 0% pressure towards production, and 1 indicating 
100%. The two types of pressure have an effect on the allocation of resources to production 
and security. In addition to this, there is an extra loop. This is the shortcuts loop which 
simulates workers tendency to take shortcuts when faced with an increased demand for 
production. When faced with pressure to do work, employees tend to take shortcuts and cut 
corners in their work. This ‘Effect of Work Pressure on Shortcuts’ has an effect on the 
‘Allocation of Resources to Security’. The higher the pressure to do work, the more the 
shortcuts loop comes into effect stopping resources being allocated to security. Both 
‘Resources to Increase Security’ and ‘Resources for Production’ has a minimal amount of 
resources they can not drop below. 
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The model of the generic oil and gas company is highly aggregated and, thus, “simple”. 
Would making the model more realistic and complex, adding more parameters, change its 
results significantly? The model should in the future be adapted and extended to give an even 
better description of an oil and gas company. But we argue that the four feedback loops “B1: 
PRODUCTION FOCUS – WORKING HARD”, “B2: SECURITY FOCUS – WORKING 
SMART”, “R: REINVESTMENT”, and “B3: SHORTCUTS” are ubiquitous to many 
enterprises, both the oil and gas sector and other sectors (Repenning and Sterman 2001, p. 3). 
 
So while the model is simple we argue that it captures the most important feedback structures 
(and the evolution of these), that shape the dynamic behavior of the system over time. 
 
The model is tested for dimensional consistency. The same is valid for extreme values. If, for 
example ‘Total Resources’ is set to zero, resources for production and security is set to zero, 
and with them performance and security level. If ‘Pressure Allocation’ is set to its extreme 
values 1 or 0, either resources for production or to increase security falls to its minimum level. 
If the minimum amount of resources dedicated to production is set to zero, then resources 
dedicated to production can fall to zero and if so production also drops to zero. Also, 
integration tests have been performed. 
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6 Model Simulations and Policy Testing 
In this chapter I will simulate different management policies and look at how different 
strategies of resource allocation to production and increasing security affect the company’s 
performance. The types of incidents in the model are based on a risk matrix from a genuine 
oil and gas company. The incidents range from 1 to 6, where 1 is an insignificant incident and 
6 is catastrophic. Incident type 1 can occur quite often, while incident type 6 is very rare. 
 
In integrated operations, a security incident can have serious performance and HSE 
implications. The cost of one day of production downtime in offshore operations is estimated 
to 1.6 million € for smaller platforms and 25 million € for the larger ones. And although a 
security incident is serious enough, it can have additional implications to just the short term 
costs of downtime and HSE implications. As the processes in the company changes, 
depending on each other, policies chosen by management and other important actors can lead 
the system into a highly undesirable state. 
 
Following are the simulation of three different management policies and their results. The 
different policies each have a specific focus. In Policy 1 management has focus on production 
as a solution to solve performance gaps. In Policy 2 the focus lies heavy on improving 
security as a way to recoup from drops in performance. In the third policy management makes 
an effort to balance resource allocation between production and increasing security. 
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Figure 11 – Results from simulation of policies 1, 2 and 3. 
 
6.1 Policy 1 - Production 
In Policy 1 management believes that increased work pressure is the way to get back what is 
lost when there is a performance drop. ‘Pressure Allocation’ in the model is set to 0.9, 
indicating that there is a 90% pressure towards production when a performance gap occurs. 
The simulation of this policy is labeled “Policy 1 – Production” in Figure 11 and is the blue 
line marked with 1’s in the four graphs. 
 
Imagine the following scenario: At an offshore platform, production is going good. All 
systems are functioning well and security level and performance are stable. The system is in 
equilibrium. But one week (week 5 in the simulation in Figure 11) the platform experiences a 
security incident, classified as a type 3 security incident. To close the performance gap and 
get back to desired performance management puts pressure on employees to work overtime 
and cut corners where this is possible. Employees working on more strategic processes, such 
as improving security are moved to more pressing matters. The most important thing now is 
to meet the performance goals that are set by upper management. If these goals are not met 
there will be repercussions, so proactive work like increasing security will just have to wait. 
  29
Besides, putting these tasks on hold does not have any significant negative effect, and moving 
resources to production gives an immediate return on investment, namely increased 
production. It is considered a temporary solution, just so the platform can get back to desired 
performance level and maybe recoup some of the losses. 
 
And initially that is exactly what happens. The company’s performance recoups to its original 
level and actually exceeds it. The management is thrilled, not only have they bounced back 
from the incident. They are also doing so well that they can make up for some of the losses 
caused by the incident and its implications. But the company has limited resources, and so 
moving resources to production means that they have to be taken from another source, in this 
case increasing security. And the reduced amount of resources used to increase security 
means that security level will start to deteriorate. Important patches are not installed, or the 
work of installing them are not done as properly as desired, an analysis of the root cause of 
the incident can suffer as there are limited resources to perform tasks. And finally the solution 
to the initial problem may be abysmal. 
 
While production is measured in barrels of oil produced and gives an exact measurement, 
security is more of an abstract value. It is difficult to measure it in a specific value. Also, the 
effects of neglecting the task of increasing security are delayed and so they can be difficult for 
management to see. 
 
As described in the above text, we can see from the performance graph in Figure 11 that 
performance drops when the company experiences an incident. As there is pressure from 
management to work extra and cut corners where possible to solve the problem, ‘Resources 
for Production’ increases and ‘Resources to Increase Security’ is reduced equivalently. The 
reduction in resources increasing it causes security level to deteriorate, and in approximately 
week 45 the security level has dropped so low that even the maximum amount of resources 
devoted to production does not help. Performance drops down to a more permanent poor level 
and the system has moved into a highly undesirable state. 
 
6.2 Policy 2 – Security 
In policy 2 the management has a much higher focus on improving security, and this is 
prioritized when there are incidents and disturbances to the system. ‘Pressure Allocation’ in 
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the model is set to 0.2, (20% pressure towards production) indicating that it is management 
policy to keep focus on security improvement at all times. The simulation of this policy is 
labeled “Policy 2 – Security” and is the red line marked with the number 2 in the four 
different graphs in Figure 11. 
 
Imagine the following scenario: In the beginning, as in the first scenario, the system is in 
equilibrium. But one week (week 5 in the simulation in Figure 11) the offshore platform 
experiences a security incident. The incident is classified as a type 3 security incident. As 
opposed to the management policy in the first simulation where the pressure was on 
production, management now has a different approach. Their focus is on maintaining (and 
improving) security. When the incident occurs the management keeps their cool, although 
there is a lot of pressure to recover to the targeted level of production. Resources are moved 
from production to increasing security and security level rises. The company can thoroughly 
identify the incident and find the underlying reason for why it occurred. By doing so they can 
correct it properly and implement a solution that reduces the probability of the incident 
happening again. 
 
But as in the first policy available resources are limited. As more resources are moved to 
proactive tasks, i.e. increasing security, the resources dedicated for production are reduced 
equivalently. And so, even if ‘Security Level’ rises, making the company’s information 
security more robust and able to withstand hacker attacks, worms, spam, etc. that lowers 
performance, since the resources for production are so limited the performance (i.e. 
production) falls to a level below its original one. However the performance never drops to a 
lower more permanent level, indicating that the system better can handle incidents when they 
are putting a lot of attention on increasing their information security. Even so, the company’s 
performance is not as good as original, and one can argue that the process of information 
security is overdone. 
 
6.3 Policy 3 – Balancing 
In the third policy simulated, the company tries to balance the resource allocation between 
increasing security and production. Information security is considered a risk management 
area, and investments in security are optimized to minimize their cost-risk product. To 
simulate this, ‘Pressure Allocation’ in the model is set to 0.6, indicating a 60% pressure 
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towards production. The simulation of this policy is labeled “Policy 3 – Balancing” and is the 
green line marked with 3 in the graphs in Figure 11. 
 
The scenario is the same as in the previous simulations. The system is originally in 
equilibrium, but one week the offshore platform experiences an incident (week 5 in the 
simulation). The incident is classified as a type 3 incident. Management has a balanced view 
on investing in production versus increasing security. No major changes in the allocation of 
resources are done and so both ‘Resources to Increase Security’ and ‘Resources for 
Production’ remains almost unchanged (slight increase in ‘Resources to Increase Security’). 
People who are already committed to security work continue working on these processes, 
correcting the error and preventing it from affecting the system again. At the same time, 
production is not neglected. The company’s performance recovers almost all the way to the 
target level after just one week, and fully recovers in week 12. The company does not make 
up for the lost production, but maybe more importantly, it does not fall into an undesirable 
state and it recovers to its targeted performance level. Resource allocation is not weighted too 
much to either production or increasing security. 
 
The last policy seems to be the best one. But balancing resource allocation in real life is an 
extremely difficult task, as parameters change constantly, as do processes. Also, evaluating 
the value of information security is very difficult. Less than half of business ever evaluate 
their return on investment on security spend (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004). Resources spent 
on information security are seen as overhead rather than an investment. Senior management 
views information security as a forced expenditure rather than something that can bring 
business benefits. 
 
Also, in one year the company might experience more than one single incident. This is 
plausible when considering the risk matrix developed from case studies. Therefore additional 
simulations are required before any policy recommendations can be given. 
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7 Multiple Incidents 
I have previously simulated what will happen to a company’s performance should they 
experience an incident. But there are no guarantees that only one incident will occur. I will in 
this section look at what happens when more than one incident occurs, and how this affects 
the company. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Results from simulation of policies 4, 5 and 6. 
 
7.1 Policy 4 
In this policy simulation the company is only affected by one incident. In the next policy 
simulated the scenario is similar but the company experiences a second incident some time 
after the first. I have done this for comparison reasons, showing the different reaction of the 
system when there are multiple incidents instead of one. In this scenario the company 
experiences a very severe incident, it is of type 6 and is considered catastrophic, in week 5 of 
the simulation. This simulation is marked “Policy 4” in graphs in Figure 12 and is the blue 
line marked with the number1.  ‘Pressure Allocation’ simulating management policy is set to 
0.6 indicating a 60% pressure towards production. Immediately after the incident the 
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company’s performance drops to below half. As a result of the management’s policy of 
focusing on production, ‘Resources for Production’ are immediately increased, and 
‘Resources to Increase Security’ are reduced equivalently. Also, pressure from the Shortcuts 
loop works as an amplifier on this reallocation of resources. 
 
Thanks to the great increase in ‘Resources for Production’, the company’s performance 
recovers quite quickly (in week 6) and actually improves. From week 6 till 9 the performance 
higher than what it was compared to before the incident. But because of the limited resources 
now allocated to improving security, the work of analyzing the accident, implementing 
solutions that fix the fundamental problem is not prioritized. ‘Security Level’ diminishes, and 
as a result it has a negative effect on ‘Performance’. It drops down to a lower level again, on 
which is stabilizes. Over some weeks, the system mitigates the damages from the incident, 
and ‘Resources to Increase Security’ and ‘Resources for Production’ returns to their initial 
values. This enables the company to recover to its original ‘Security Level’ and in 
approximately week 55 ‘Performance’ is back at desired level. This is thanks to the 
management and their policy to avoid neglecting information security even when there is an 
incident that affects performance and pressure to recover quickly is high. But is it adequate? 
In the next policy test I will simulate what happens when there are two incidents. 
 
7.2 Policy 5 
The simulation is marked “Policy 5” in the graphs in Figure 12 and is the red line marked 
with the number 2. In this scenario, the company experiences two incidents. The first one 
occurs in week 5 and is considered a type 6 incident (catastrophic). And as this is not enough, 
in week 15 there is a second incident. It is not as serious as the first on, this time a type 3 
incident, but it still disrupts the system. According to the risk matrix that is developed from 
case studies, such a scenario is plausible. ‘Pressure Allocation’ simulating management’s 
policy on resource allocation is set to 0.6 indicating that there is 60% pressure towards 
production. 
 
The dynamics of this scenario is, up until the second incident, identical to that of the previous 
scenario. But as the second incident occurs it becomes clear that the system is in a fragile 
state. The second incident, although small, causes a shift in the allocation of resources. 
Instead of ‘Resources to Increase Security’ and ‘Resources for Production’ returning to their 
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original level, the system is not able to mitigate the impact, and shifts into an undesired state 
with stable underperformance. Not unlike the one seen in “Policy 1 – Production”. 
 
7.3 Policy 6 
The simulation of this scenario is marked “Policy 6”  in the graphs in Figure 12 and is the 
green line marked with the number 3. This scenario is very similar to the one in Policy 5. The 
occurrence of incidents and the time at which they happen are identical, but in this scenario 
the managements focus lie more heavily on proactive work, i.e. increasing security. ‘Pressure 
Allocation’ is set to 0.3 indicating only a 30% management pressure towards production. 
 
Again there is a catastrophic incident in week 5, which severely disrupts performance. And 
although many resources are moved to production, influenced by (but not only because of) the 
Shortcuts loop, the management policy of keeping much more focus on security (‘Pressure 
Allocation’ = 0.3) keeps the resource allocation more balanced. The performance curve 
follows much of the same behavior peaking shortly after the incident, but the top is somewhat 
lower and it actually drops below what was the case in the previous two scenarios. This is 
because the amount of resources dedicated for production is somewhat lower. At the other 
hand, this means that ‘Resources to Increase Production’ is higher and so ‘Security Level’ 
does not diminish as much, and recovers faster. 
 
The focus on security not only leads to a faster recovery of ‘Security Level’, but when the 
second incident occurs in week 15, the system can absorb it without going into an undesirable 
state of under performance. The backside of the medal is that since the focus lie so heavily on 
increasing security, ‘Resources to Increase Security’ stabilizes on a much higher level, which 
consequently has to lead to fewer resources available for production. The company’s 
performance recovers, but at a level somewhat below what is desired. 
 
7.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Running a sensitivity analysis can give some insights as to how the dynamics of the system 
behaves. In this sensitivity analysis  two incidents are set to occur. A type 6 incident occurs in 
week 5, and a type 3 incident in week 15. ‘Pressure Allocation’ is set to go from 0.3 to 0.8, to 
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see how the system behaves as management policies change. Since it is ‘Pressure Allocation’ 
that I am interested in, no other values are changed. 
 
 
Figure 13 – Sensitivity analysis of ’Pressure Allocation’ 
 
From Figure 13 one can see that the system basically has two possible states that it can end up 
in after having experienced two incidents. Either the performance returns to desired level 
(with some variations above or below), or the performance drops permanently to a lower 
level. That is the system enters an undesirable state. 
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8 Increase in Desired Performance 
It is not only incidents that can affect a company’s performance. In the following simulations 
I will look at what happens when there is an increase in the desired performance. Since I am 
only interested in how the policies from management affects the system when there is an 
increase in the desired performance, only ‘Pressure Allocation’ is changed. All other 
parameters remain unchanged. 
 
 
Figure 14 – Results from simulation of policies 7 and 8. 
 
8.1 Policy 7 
The scenario is as follows: The production on the offshore platform is going well. Production 
demands are met and the system is in equilibrium. But one week (week 5 in the simulation) 
the management on the offshore platform is faced with a demand for increased production. 
Upper management has decided that the platform has a potential for higher production, and 
the ‘Desired Performance’ is increased by 1% from 150 to 151,5. ‘Pressure Allocation’ 
simulating management pressure is set to 0,5, indicating a 50% pressure towards production. 
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What happens when policy 7 is simulated is shown in the four graphs in Figure 14 and is the 
blue line marked with the number 1. 
 
As a result of the increase by 1% in ‘Desired Performance’ more resources are moved to 
increasing security. Consequently ‘Resources for Production’ is reduced equivalently. This is 
because it is management policy to keep focus on increasing information security when facing 
disruptions. As ‘Resources to Increase Security’ rise ‘Security Level’ increases. But since it is 
a delay for it to increase the company will first experience a small drop in performance. When 
‘Security Level’ starts rising and thus affecting ‘Performance’ positively, the company’s 
performance will rise above its initial level, although still falling a bit short of the new desired 
level of performance. 
 
8.2 Policy 8 
The scenario is the same, but in this policy management is much more likely to put pressure 
on production, asking employees to cut corners and take shortcuts where possible to meet 
performance demands. To simulate this ‘Pressure Allocation’ is set to 0,9 indicating a 90% 
pressure towards production. The simulation of policy 8 can be seen in the four graphs in 
Figure 14 and is the red line marked with the number 2. 
 
As a result of the management policy to throw recourses into production when there is a 
performance gap, ‘Resources for Production’ starts to increase when the offshore platform is 
faced with a new performance demand. As a result of the 1% increase in ‘Desired 
Performance’ in week 5, ‘Resources for Production’ starts rising influenced by the Shortcuts 
loop. The company’s performance rises, but since the increased focus on production has lead 
to a decrease in ‘Resources to Increase Security’, with a delay ‘Security Level’ starts 
diminishing, having a negative impact on ‘Performance’. The situation escalates as more and 
more resources are moved to production as performance starts to drop, and in approximately 
week 20 is below its original level. Employees spend more and more time on coping with 
problems caused by the deteriorating security level and eventually the system can not cope, 
and goes into an undesirable state of stable low performance. 
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9 Policy Analysis and Recommendations 
In this chapter I will analyze the different policies and describe some findings using system 
archetypes. 
9.1 Coping with problems 
Wolstenholme (2002) describes the generic problem archetype “Out-of-control” which is 
shown below in Figure 15. The archetype consists of one balancing loop, which is a result of a 
control action taken by the organization to handle a problem. The unintended consequence is 
that there is a reaction from another sector in the organization, and this creates a reinforcing 
loop. This leads to a worsening of the problem, and it gets more and more out of control. It is 
usually the control action, rather than the outcome that creates the reaction. 
 
Figure 15 – Out-of-control problem archetype. 
 
For every problem archetype, there is a solution archetype. This is presented in Figure 16. The 
solution archetype suggests that the solution to an out-of-control archetype lies in 
emphasizing a direct link between the problem and the unwanted reaction. The purpose of this 
being is to introduce a balancing loop that counters the reinforcing reaction. 
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Figure 16 – Out-of-control solution archetype. 
 
I hypothesize that the way companies and management react to information security incidents 
leading to performance gaps, can move the system state from a desirable one to an 
undesirable state of weakened resilience. This can possibly cause the system to move into an 
undesirable state of constant under performance. 
 
The processes working in the company when afflicted by incident(s) can be described by an 
“Out-of-control” archetype. The problem archetype is seen in Figure 17. In policies 1 and 5 
we see typical “better before worse” scenarios, which behavior fits the archetype. The 
company is afflicted by an incident (in the case of policy 5 there are two incidents) and a 
performance gap occurs. Management has a production oriented focus, and so employees are 
more likely to cut corners and take shortcuts where possible, and in addition more resources 
are moved to production. 
 
Initially this is successful, with a performance that recovers and actually improves. But what 
can be difficult for management to see is that this kind of focus on production leads to 
diminishing security level. This can be difficult to recognize for different reasons. There is a 
division in time between when the incident occurred and the management’s policies to focus 
more in production came into action, to the security level starts deteriorating. The unintended 
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consequence of a deteriorating security level has a delay that can “hide” it from the view of 
the decision makers that initiated its cause. Another reason that it can be difficult to recognize 
that security level will suffer from production focus when facing a performance gap is that 
security level is very difficult to assess. As previously mentioned, less than half of businesses 
ever evaluate their return on investment on security spend. 
 
 
Figure 17 – ”Working Hard”. An Out-of-control archetype showing some possible dynamics of the system. 
 
As the state of information security worsens, it has a negative impact on performance, causing 
the performance gap to increase. What was initially a solution has now worsened the problem, 
as it starts to get out of control. These dynamics are similar to the ones in IT management 
identified by Moore and Antao (2006), where it is shown that shifting personnel from planned 
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(pro active) work to problem-repair work to manage downtime can work in the short term, but 
in long term has costs that can be overwhelming. 
 
Both in policy 1 and 5 (shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 ) one can argue the system is not 
resilient. Resilience, in this case, being the capacity of the system to undergo disturbances and 
still maintain its functions, structures and controls. As the system experienced an incident it 
was not able to absorb the impact and it went into an undesirable state of stable under 
performance. 
 
The solution to the discussed problem would be to have a more balanced allocation of 
resources, particularly when the system experiences an incident and is fragile. A balanced 
view on resource allocation would in this case be not moving so many resources to production 
when there is a performance gap. Alternatively it would be increasing the total number of 
resources, keeping security from deteriorating. 
 
The solution archetype is shown in Figure 18 and the solution loop B2: Balanced Resource 
Allocation counters the reinforcing loop R: Neglecting Security - Deteriorating Resilience.  
One can see from policy 2, 3, 4 and 6 that when management has a greater focus on 
maintaining security level (not moving resources to production when faced with a 
performance gap) that the system does not move into an undesirable state. It is resilient. 
  42
 
Figure 18 – The solution archetype to the problem archetype in Figure 17. 
 
 
Cooke (2004) writes: 
“While it may be “normal” or “natural” for an organization to respond to production pressures 
as its first priority, it should be the role of management, especially senior management and the 
Board of Directors, to make safety the organization’s first priority. If the company fails to do 
this, then safety must be enforced by the regulators. Safety commitment is not self-sustaining, 
and so leverage must be applied to maintain it. Without safety, there can be no assurance of 
production. Production issues can be dealt with once safety has been addressed. With safety 
as the first priority, reinforcing feedback loops will operate as virtuous circles instead of 
vicious circles. As commitment to safety increases, losses from incidents will fall, productive 
experiences will grow, and production performance will improve.” 
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Even though Cooke (2004) focuses on safety programs and its effect on incidents and 
production in a coal mine there are some parallels, when viewing safety and security as 
related areas (Cooke argues that there are conceptual similarities between safety management 
and quality management). Safety is an important factor influencing production (performance). 
An incident causes downtime and loss of production. The higher the level of security, the less 
incidents/impact from incidents. One can argue that with integrated operations, information 
security will become as mission critical to production as safety is the mining industry. 
 
From the policies we see that the system can work as a vicious circle leading the system into 
an undesirable state (policies 1 and 5), or a more virtuos circle actually leading to improved 
performance (policy 4). This is supported by the sensitivity analysis in Figure 13 in which the 
system, depending on management policy (‘Pressure Allocation’ in the model) either is 
resilient or falls into an unwanted state, which in itself is resilient. This is similar to Cooke's 
(2004) conceptual model where the system can operate in two ways, either as a vicious circle 
resulting in failure, the other being a virtuos circle resulting in success. 
 
9.2 Increasing Performance 
When managers are faced with the challenge of increasing performance, often their focus will 
lie on production. It can be natural choice, if you produce a certain amount pr man hour, 
increasing the man hours spent on production will give you the wanted result. And in an 
organization with unlimited resources that might be true. But in most (dear I say all) 
organizations that is not the case. 
 
Wolstenholme (2002) describes the generic problem archetype called Underachievement 
which is shown below in Figure 19. The problem archetype consists of a reinforcing intended 
loop to achieve a successful outcome in one sector of an organization. The reaction from 
another sector, usually as a result of hitting against a resource constraint, creates a balancing 
unintended loop. This causes a delayed underachievement over time. 
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Figure 19 – Underachievement problem archetype. 
 
The solution archetype in Figure 20 suggests that the closed loop solution to an 
underachievement archetype lies in trying to use some element of the achievement action to 
minimize the reaction in other parts of the organization. Usually it is unblocking the resource 
constraint. The way to do this is introducing a reinforcing loop that counters the balancing 
reaction. 
 
  45
 
Figure 20 – Underachievement solution archetype. 
 
I hypothesize that manager’s actions and policies when faced with a demand of increased 
performance can constrain the desired performance, or even worse, cause the system to 
deteriorate into an undesirable state. 
 
The processes working in such a scenario can be described by an “Underachievement” 
archetype shown in Figure 21. Management’s goal is to increase performance, and to achieve 
this they put pressure on production. Workers are influenced and pushed to cut corners were 
possible and take shortcuts in their work. Tasks directly related to production are prioritized 
over more proactive work (i.e. increasing security) and as employee throughput increases so 
does performance. But the cutting of corners and shortcuts taken by employees has a delayed 
cost. With a delay their allocation of resources causes security level to drop and it has a 
negative impact on performance which is balanced and leveled out, or even worse starts to 
deteriorate. When a performance gap occurs the dynamics of the “out-of-control” archetype in 
Figure 17 takes over. 
 
In policy 8 shown in Figure 14 we see the result of what happens when there is increase in 
desired performance. Management’s production focus initially gives an increase in 
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performance as production gains priority over other tasks. But after some delay security level 
starts to deteriorate. Performance is limited and possibly even starts to decrease, thus causing 
a performance gap. 
 
 
Figure 21 – ”Production Focus”, an Underachievement problem archetype. 
 
The solution to this problem is for management to always have security in focus when trying 
to increase the company’s performance. The solution archetype is shown in Figure 22. There 
must be a balance when dividing resources between production and security. If management 
ensures that enough resources are used on security this will hinder the deterioration of 
security level, and the company’s performance can increase. 
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Figure 22 – Solution archetype to the ”Production Focus” archetype in Figure 21. 
 
9.3 Resilience against positive change – Getting out of an 
undesirable state 
IT operational best practices, such as the Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
(ITIL) provide a framework to start defining repeatable and verifiable IT processes. However 
organizations face two very difficult questions on their journey towards process improvement: 
How and where do they start? 
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In (Behr, Kim, and Spafford 2004) the authors have identified several problems that are 
common in an IT-department. Say there is a problem with a server that has gone down during 
patching. For many organizations this is critical and could possibly put them out of business if 
it is not solved fast. If there are no proper policies in place the problem will be left to the 
proper person(s) in the IT-department to handle at their own will. Since this in many cases is a 
very critical problem, the pressure to come up with a solution fast, is very high. An IT-
technician’s job can be at stake if he does not get the server up and running and so quick fixes 
are highly probable. The technician works around the problem in his own way, and solves the 
problem. Chances are the solution is unique (not easily reproduced), and does not fix the 
underlying problem. Also the solution might not be very stable and it can be difficult, if not to 
say impossible, for other than the person who implemented it to maintain later on. The quick 
fix solves the problem but the fix can actually lead to even greater trouble later on. What if the 
person that is responsible for the server and the fixes no longer is a part of the organization or 
available to help when there is a problem? Then you have a box which nobody quite knows 
how works and the organization can be in really serious trouble. Something that is important 
to think of and that is often overlooked is that if one person single-handedly can save the ship, 
that person can probably single-handedly sink the ship, too. 
 
From the archetype in Figure 23 you can see that when there is a problem related to the 
organization’s IT system, here called an IT-fire, this will be solved by increased work from 
IT-personnel. They will most lightly have pressure on them to correct the problem fast, and so 
it is probable that their solutions not always are in appliance with proper change management 
policies. They solve the problem, but the number of quick fixes increases, and these can in 
time cause even more problems, increasing the number of IT fires making the workload so big 
that the organization will have problems coping, making it an everyday struggle to survive. 
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Figure 23 – Out-of-control archetype illustrating the dynamics of quick fixes leading to an increased 
burden for IT operations. 
 
To counter this problem it is important that management is involved in IT-operations, and 
specifically as in this example and discussed in (Behr, Kim, and Spafford 2004) that there are 
strict management policies in place, so that actions taken by IT-personnel adhere to these. 
Implementing best practice processes like ITIL can help avoiding quick fixes and improve 
performance continuously. 
 
From the archetype in Figure 24 you can see that the solution is to implement (and follow) 
management policies that counter and removes the possibility of quick fixes. This will in the 
longer run help the organization removing IT fires caused by quick fixes. The process has 
similarities with findings in (Repenning and Sterman 2001). If you allow quick fixes and 
individual heroics to set the standards you will probably have a better before worse situation, 
when in the beginning the organization will cope and recoup from errors, but after a while the 
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results of the quick fixes will start causing increasingly more problems. If one on the other 
hand follows strict management policies it is possible that one will experience a slight 
worsening of the situation before it improves, worse before better, but this will in the longer 
run be the better of the two scenarios. 
 
Figure 24 – Solution to the out of control archetype in Figure 23. 
 
9.3.1 Resilience against change 
As management tries to implement new practices and apply new policies, employees can 
learn and self organize to avoid new practices. This resilience against change can seriously 
undermine the new policies and threaten the organization. One typical reason is that an 
employee that usually has been responsible for fixing problems has been getting credit for 
their work when they correct a critical error. Because of their ability to fix critical errors they 
are seen as important to the organization, an importance that might fade if the system is 
changed so that quick fixes are avoided and management policies are in place. 
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From the archetype in Figure 25 one can see the dynamics of what happens when there is an 
IT fire that is handled by individuals in the organization. In the shorter period of time this 
reduces the number of IT fires. Another effect is that the employees responsible for fixing 
problems experiences personal success They get positive feedback for fixing a problem and 
they are seen as important to the organization. This in turn can increase their resilience against 
the implementation of effective processes and controls in the organizations, causing the 
number of IT fires to increase. 
 
 
Figure 25 – Out of control problem archetype showing how resilience against effective processes and 
controls can affect IT operations. 
 
It is important for management to be aware of this possible source of resilience towards 
positive change. Proper precautions and actions against it must be taken so that IT personnel 
do not feel that their position in the organization is threatened but, rather they are a valuable 
part of the new process. If handled correctly by management, they can counteract the 
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occurrence of resilience in the organization, and subsequently successfully implement proper 
policies and processes, thus reducing the number of IT fires. 
 
 
Figure 26 – Solution archetype to the problem shown in Figure 25. 
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10 Conclusions 
In this chapter I will summarize my findings and give a summed up answer to my research 
questions. 
 
1. What are the main characteristics of resilience in a system presented in the form of a 
conceptual model of Integrated Operations when focusing on information security as a QIP 
(quality improvement process)? 
In simulations of different policies in chapters 6, 7 and 8 I have identified, described and 
shown how the oil and gas company’s resilience changes as the company experiences 
disturbances. These findings are further discussed in chapter 9. 
 
One can argue that in policies 1 and 5 the system was not resilient – it was not able to absorb 
the impacts of incidents and therefore reorganized its configuration. But resilience is not 
always a positive property. The state the system entered in policies 1 and 5 can also be 
considered resilient. Adjusting procedures, standards, processes, and maybe even more 
important, people’s behavior and attitude so that security level can be rebuilt and the desired 
level of performance can be brought back requires a lot of effort and expenditure. 
 
2. Describe these findings in dynamic stories and system archetypes. 
The findings are described in dynamic stories in chapters 6, 7 and 8 and system archetypes in 
chapter 9. 
 
3. Suggest some policies/solution archetypes that increase resilience (against negative 
change). 
Solution archetypes are suggested in chapter 9. Although I do not claim any numerical 
accuracy, I believe there are some important insights to consider. For an oil and gas company 
it seems crucial to build up resilience of the desired system state in advance. Building up 
security level to such a level that optimal performance can be achieved is seemingly the 
optimal solution. If this is not done, then the company should at least pay more attention to 
security level when the system has been affected an incident. Examples of this are policies 2 
and 6 where the system undergoes various types and amounts of incidents and still preserves 
its desired state. This is possible due do its focus on maintaining and increasing security rather 
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than just allocating  resources for production to close performance gaps. One may suggest that 
such policies will lead to less profit. But enterprises that strive for long term effectiveness, 
profitability and competitive advantage have to consider and secure the long term 
functionality of their production systems. 
 
One potential insight which is important is the effect strict resource limitations have on the 
system. Normally having strong budget discipline is sensible, but having strong resource 
limitations when serious incidents occur can threaten the systems resilience. Having resource 
redundancy to cope with the occurrence of incidents should be taken into consideration when 
planning the transfer to and daily operation of integrated operations. 
 
Hopefully these insights of the instability of resource allocation and the need to invest in 
proactive resilience will prove robust to changes and extensions of the model and analysis in 
this paper. 
 
4. Resilience can also be towards positive change, can archetypes identifying some important 
reasons for resilience in Integrated Operations when viewing information security as a QIP 
be created? 
In chapter 9 I show a potential source for resilience against positive change in an 
organization. These hypotheses are based on the findings in (Behr, Kim, and Spafford 2004) 
which are a quite generic description of IT organizations and how change and access controls 
reduce security risk and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of information technology 
management and operations. As IT undoubtedly will be an important business driver and play 
a large role in integrated operations, one can argue that the findings in (Behr, Kim, and 
Spafford 2004) is relevant also for integrated operations. 
 
10.1  Future Research 
The model is highly aggregated and thus “simple”. It should be extended and adapted to more 
closely describe real oil and gas companies. Also, assessing security level is a very difficult 
task. Further research into how the security level in an organization behaves and how it is 
assessed is needed. 
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Also there is a need to look more detailed at how performance is affected by information 
security incidents and how information security can affect performance. How can companies 
assess their security level so that their production processes can be highly resilient in a high 
performing state, at the lowest possible cost? 
 
There is a need to communicate the need for a sturdy information security process in 
companies to management. One suggestion could be the development of a management game, 
where players experience pressure to produce, information security incidents, and where the 
players can experience how their allocation of resources affects the system. 
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11 APPENDIX A - Model Transcript 
 
Minimum Security Level Required for Optimal Performance= 
 50 
 ~ 1 
 ~ As the name states the minimum security level required for optimal \ 
  performance. Can be perceived as maintaining firewalls or other software / \ 
  devices preventing operations against casual threats and disruptions. If \ 
  the security level drops below the minimum required level, optimal \ 
  performance can not be achieved. 
 | 
 
Effect of Security Level on Performance= 
 TEoSLoP(Security Level/Minimum Security Level Required for Optimal 
Performance) 
 ~ 1 
 ~ If the effect drops below 1, the optimal performance is jeopardized. We \ 
  assume that the performance is dependent on security level. A very high \ 
  security level can improve Performance, but only to a certain degree. 
 | 
 
TEoSLoP( 
 [(0,0)-(2,1.5)],(0,0),(0.2,0.3),(0.4,0.55),(0.6,0.75),(0.8,0.9),(1,1),(1.2,1.08),(1.4\ 
  ,1.135),(1.6,1.175),(1.8,1.195),(2,1.2)) 
 ~ 1 
 ~ The table function for the effect of security level on performance. 
 | 
 
Performance= 
 Resources for Production*Effectiveness of Resources for Production*Effect of 
Security Level on Performance\ 
  *Effect of Severity on Performance 
 ~ Unit/Week 
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 ~ The performance of the organization (can be measured as production of \ 
  barrels per week). It depends on resources for production, the security \ 
  level, the effect from incidents, and the effectiveness of resources for \ 
  production. 
 | 
 
Effectiveness of Resources for Production= 
 2 
 ~ Unit/Resource 
 ~ The average number of units a single resource is able to produce. 
 | 
 
Allocation of Resources to Security= 
 Pressure to Increase Security*Effect of Work Pressure on Shortcuts*(Resources for 
Production\ 
  -Min Resources for Production)/Average Resources Allocation Delay 
 ~ Resource/(Week*Week) 
 ~ The rate of resources being allocated to increase security. The value \ 
  depends on the pressure to increase security, the effect of shortcuts, \ 
  minimal amount of resources devoted to production (that can never drop \ 
  below its minimal value), and the allocation delay. 
 | 
 
Incident= 
 Incident Type*PULSE(5,1) 
 ~ 1 
 ~ The pulse that imitate an incident occurring. 
 | 
 
Incident Type= 
 0 
 ~ 1 [0,6,0.1] 
 ~ The type of incident. Ranges from 1 (insignificant incident) to 6 \ 
  (catastrophic incident). 0 indicates there is not an incident. 
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 | 
 
Desired Performance= 
 150 
 ~ Unit/Week 
 ~ The desired performance of the organization. It might be a production goal \ 
  appointed by managers or determined by customer orders. 
 | 
 
Effect of Severity on Performance= 
 TEoSoP(Severity of Incidents) 
 ~ 1 
 ~ The effect which determines the noticeable impact of the incident severity \ 
  on the performance. 
 | 
 
Performance Gap= 
 MAX(Desired Performance-Performance,0) 
 ~ Unit/Week 
 ~ The difference between desired and actual performance. If desired \ 
  performance is greater than actual performance, a performance gap occurs. 
 | 
 
Security Level Decrease= 
 Security Level/Security Level Erosion Time 
 ~ 1/Week 
 ~ The rate at which security level deteriorates. 
 | 
 
TEoSoP( 
 [(0,0)-(10,1)],(0,1),(1,0.99),(2,0.97),(3,0.95),(4,0.9),(5,0.8),(6,0)) 
 ~ 1 
 ~ Table function for the effect of severity on performance. More severe \ 
  incidents impair performance. In case of catastrophic incidents the \ 
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  performance can drop even to zero if there is not a sufficient level of \ 
  security. 
 | 
 
Severity of Incidents= 
 MAX(Incident-Security Level/100, 0) 
 ~ 1 
 ~ The severity of an incident is affected by the security level in the \ 
  organization. The severity of an incident is more efficiently mitigated \ 
  the higher the security level is. 
 | 
 
TEoWPoS( 
 [(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0.1,0.98),(0.2,0.95),(0.3,0.9),(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.5),(0.6,0.2),(0.7\ 
  ,0.1),(0.8,0.05),(0.9,0.02),(1,0)) 
 ~ 1 
 ~ Table function for the effect of work pressure on shortcuts. 
 | 
 
Effect of Work Pressure on Shortcuts= 
 TEoWPoS(Pressure to do Work) 
 ~ 1 
 ~ When faced with increasing demand for production, workers tend to take \ 
  shortcuts in their work. The higher the pressure to do work, the more \ 
  likely workers are taking shortcuts - they spare more time for production \ 
  at the cost of security increase. 
 | 
 
Security Level= INTEG ( 
 +Security Level Increase-Security Level Decrease, 
  Effectiveness of Resources for Security*Resources to Increase 
Security*Security Level Erosion Time\ 
  ) 
 ~ 1 
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 ~ The aggregated measure for technical, human and organizational security \ 
  culture. The higher the security level the less damage are caused by \ 
  various incidents. A metaphor of the security level - a shield, armor, \ 
  bullet proof vest. One who wears the bulletproof vest can get hurt but the \ 
  impact of the shot is mitigated. 
 | 
 
Resources to Increase Security= INTEG ( 
 -Allocation of Resources to Production+Allocation of Resources to Security, 
  0.25*Total Resources) 
 ~ Resource/Week 
 ~ Resources dedicated to improving security. 
 | 
 
Min Resources for Security= 
 0.1*Total Resources 
 ~ Resource/Week 
 ~ The minimal amount of resources dedicated to improving security. Resources \ 
  to improve security can never drop below this value. 
 | 
 
Min Resources for Production= 
 0.5*Total Resources 
 ~ Resource/Week 
 ~ The minimal amount of resources dedicated to production. Resources to \ 
  production can never drop below this value. 
 | 
 
Pressure to do Work= 
 Pressure to Close Performance Gap*Pressure Allocation 
 ~ 1 
 ~ The pressure in the organization towards production. Is affected by the \ 
  pressure to close the performance gap and a managerial decision regarding \ 
  pressure allocation. 
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 | 
 
Allocation of Resources to Production= 
 Pressure to do Work*(Resources to Increase Security-Min Resources for 
Security)/Average Resources Allocation Delay 
 ~ Resource/(Week*Week) 
 ~ The rate of resources being allocated to production. It depends on the \ 
  pressure to do work and the resources for increasing security (which can \ 
  not drop below its minimum value), and the allocation delay. 
 | 
 
Average Resources Allocation Delay= 
 1 
 ~ Week 
 ~ It takes some time to move people from one work mode to another. This \ 
  value simulates the average delay which affects the transition of \ 
  resources from increasing security to production or from production to \ 
  security. 
 | 
 
Pressure to Close Performance Gap= 
 Performance Gap/Company Goal for Performance Gap Satisfaction 
 ~ 1 
 ~ The pressure which arises in an organization once the performance gap \ 
  (difference between desired and actual performance) exists. 
 | 
 
Pressure to Increase Security= 
 Pressure to Close Performance Gap*(1-Pressure Allocation) 
 ~ 1 
 ~ The pressure in the organization to increase security. It depends on \ 
  pressure to close performance gap and a managerial decision regarding \ 
  pressure allocation. 
 | 
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Resources for Production= INTEG ( 
 Allocation of Resources to Production-Allocation of Resources to Security, 
  Total Resources-Resources to Increase Security) 
 ~ Resource/Week 
 ~ Resources dedicated to production. 
 | 
 
Security Increase Delay= 
 2 
 ~ Week 
 ~ The time it takes to increase security 
 | 
 
Security Level Increase= 
 DELAY3(Effectiveness of Resources for Security*Resources to Increase 
Security,Security Increase Delay\ 
  ) 
 ~ 1/Week 
 ~ The rate at which the security level is built. It is not an instant \ 
  process and requires time, which is modeled as a third order delay. 
 | 
 
Effectiveness of Resources for Security= 
 1 
 ~ 1/Resource 
 ~ The effectiveness of resources dedicated to security. 
 | 
 
Company Goal for Performance Gap Satisfaction= 
 25 
 ~ Unit/Week 
 ~ The company's goal to close performance gaps. 
 | 
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Security Level Erosion Time= 
 2 
 ~ Week 
 ~ The time it takes for security to erode 
 | 
 
Pressure Allocation= 
 0.6 
 ~ 1 [0,1] 
 ~ Pressure allocation indicates the managerial decision regarding allocation \ 
  of resources to improve security or to production. The value ranges from 0 \ 
  to 1. The higher the value, the managers put more pressure towards \ 
  production. 
 | 
 
Total Resources= 
 100 
 ~ Resource/Week 
 ~ The total value of available resources in an organization. 
 | 
 
******************************************************** 
 .Control 
********************************************************~ 
  Simulation Control Parameters 
 | 
 
FINAL TIME  = 50 
 ~ Week 
 ~ The final time for the simulation. 
 | 
 
INITIAL TIME  = 0 
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 ~ Week 
 ~ The initial time for the simulation. 
 | 
 
SAVEPER  =  
        TIME STEP 
 ~ Week [0,?] 
 ~ The frequency with which output is stored. 
 | 
 
TIME STEP  = 0.1 
 ~ Week [0,?] 
 ~ The time step for the simulation. 
 | 
 
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names 
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored 
*View 1 
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10,6,Security Level Increase,436,135,48,16,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0 
12,7,48,883,112,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0 
1,8,10,7,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(835,110)| 
1,9,10,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(718,110)| 
11,10,48,792,110,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0 
10,11,Security Level Decrease,792,134,48,16,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0 
10,12,Performance,823,447,43,9,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,13,Performance Gap,816,525,58,9,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,14,Desired Performance,941,575,44,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,15,1,10,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(688,58)| 
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1,17,16,10,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(825,68)| 
1,18,14,13,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(880,558)| 
10,19,Pressure to Increase Security,94,612,58,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,20,Resources to Increase Security,290,416,60,60,3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,21,Effectiveness of Resources for Security,283,159,52,24,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,22,20,6,1,0,43,0,2,65,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(343,228)| 
1,23,21,6,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(357,140)| 
10,24,Resources for Production,592,414,59,60,3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,25,24,12,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(687,379)| 
1,26,27,24,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(492,455)| 
11,27,300,445,455,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0 
10,28,Allocation of Resources to Production,445,478,81,15,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0 
10,29,Pressure to do Work,515,569,48,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,30,Company Goal for Performance Gap Satisfaction,885,682,61,24,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,31,30,54,1,0,45,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(805,662)| 
1,32,20,28,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(335,490)| 
10,33,Total Resources,436,255,53,9,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,34,27,20,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(394,455)| 
1,35,29,28,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(475,534)| 
1,36,38,20,4,0,43,22,2,128,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(394,377)| 
1,37,38,24,100,0,45,22,2,0,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(491,377)| 
11,38,732,444,377,6,8,34,3,0,0,3,0,0,0 
10,39,Allocation of Resources to Security,444,353,79,16,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0 
1,40,24,39,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(528,333)| 
1,41,19,39,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(86,286)| 
10,42,Pressure Allocation,331,656,34,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,43,42,29,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(424,647)| 
1,44,42,19,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(209,645)| 
10,45,Min Resources for Security,307,530,87,9,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,46,Min Resources for Production,542,299,60,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,47,45,28,1,0,45,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(407,528)| 
1,48,46,39,1,0,45,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(464,320)| 
10,49,Security Increase Delay,324,70,50,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
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1,50,49,5,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(401,71)| 
10,51,Average Resources Allocation Delay,416,414,65,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,52,51,38,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(426,387)| 
1,53,51,27,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(421,434)| 
10,54,Pressure to Close Performance Gap,749,626,59,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,55,13,54,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(804,568)| 
1,56,54,19,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(427,774)| 
1,57,54,29,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(617,607)| 
1,58,33,46,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(458,267)| 
10,59,Total Resources,376,576,64,13,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|10|B|128-128-128 
1,60,59,45,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|128-128-128,1|(338,565)| 
10,61,Effect of Work Pressure on Shortcuts,99,486,47,24,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,62,29,61,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(335,635)| 
10,63,TEoWPoS,101,554,34,9,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,64,63,61,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(97,531)| 
10,65,Effectiveness of Resources for Production,965,481,52,24,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,66,65,12,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(890,473)| 
10,67,Severity of Incidents,852,250,36,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,68,Incident,906,167,28,9,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,69,Effect of Severity on Performance,886,359,57,16,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,70,TEoSoP,950,302,27,9,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,71,1,67,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(754,155)| 
1,72,67,69,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(880,291)| 
1,73,70,69,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(926,322)| 
1,74,68,67,0,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(885,199)| 
10,75,Incident Type,972,245,45,9,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,76,75,68,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(943,211)| 
1,77,12,13,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(823,483)| 
1,78,61,39,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(97,375)| 
1,79,1,82,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(736,245)| 
1,80,69,12,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(859,394)| 
10,81,Minimum Security Level Required for Optimal 
Performance,641,239,62,24,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
10,82,Effect of Security Level on Performance,767,319,55,23,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
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1,83,81,82,1,0,45,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(709,272)| 
10,84,TEoSLoP,659,286,31,9,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0 
1,85,84,82,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(693,296)| 
1,86,82,12,1,0,43,0,2,192,0,-1--1--1,|10|B|0-0-0,1|(800,375)| 
12,87,0,696,516,63,63,4,132,0,24,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|14|I|0-0-0 
B1: Focus on production 
12,88,0,513,688,52,52,4,132,0,24,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|14|I|0-0-0 
B2: Focus on security 
12,89,0,530,196,54,54,4,132,0,24,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|14|I|0-0-0 
R: Reinvest- ment 
12,90,0,164,404,55,55,4,132,0,24,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|14|I|0-0-0 
B3: Shortcuts 
1,91,21,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,-1--1--1,,1|(436,138)| 
1,92,20,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,-1--1--1,,1|(456,252)| 
1,93,16,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,-1--1--1,,1|(759,87)| 
1,94,33,20,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,-1--1--1,,1|(390,304)| 
1,95,20,24,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,-1--1--1,,1|(434,415)| 
1,96,33,24,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,-1--1--1,,1|(483,304)| 
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12 APPENDIX B - Full Model View 
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